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**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence****VIA: Deputy Director for Plans****SUBJECT: Observations about Vietnam from Palmer Hoyt to President Johnson**

1. This memorandum is for the Director's information.
2. Attached for your perusal is a report to President Johnson from Palmer Hoyt, editor and publisher, Denver Post, and a member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information. Mr. Hoyt recently undertook a mission to Vietnam at the request of the President to study United States Information Agency problems there.
3. In his report to the President, Mr. Hoyt made several observations which might interest you. He notes that the military effort, great as it may be, merely buys us time. He sees our major objective as that of helping the Vietnamese build political and economic conditions that will give the people the means and the incentives to resist a covert Communist take over. Noting that it would be futile to look for quick results, Mr. Hoyt points up the necessity for concentration on and attention to:
  - a. better understanding among ourselves of the long-term implications of our commitments to Vietnam;
  - b. building grass roots leadership in the countryside;

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c. helping the Government of Vietnam to become more representative of the whole population and encourage it to identify itself with the aspirations of the mass of the people;

d. giving very high priority to the rural development program;

e. reducing the American and Vietnamese bureaucracy in Saigon;

f. channeling the energies of Vietnamese youth toward the job of rebuilding Vietnam;

g. expanding the education system in Vietnam;

h. improving the Vietnamese language capability of U. S. officials and employees assigned to Vietnam;

i. spending more money buying intelligence and defectors; he observed that it costs \$100,000 to kill one Viet Cong.

4. As you know, CIA operational activities, particularly those included within our covert action program, are designed to achieve the goals noted above by Mr. Hoyt. Our Political Action Teams are deeply involved in building grass roots leadership in the countryside and in assisting the GVN's rural construction program, through a variety of civic action activities. We also have leadership development operations to help build for the future, and our programs in the veteran, youth, trade union, and religious field help the GVN in its nation-building program and in martialing these segments of society in support of the war effort. Our work with GVN officials at the national, provincial, village, and hamlet levels helps build up the Government of Vietnam as an institution more representative of the people. We are, of course, in complete agreement with Mr. Hoyt's suggestion that we spend more money on "buying intelligence" but also realize that there are limits to the usefulness of this suggestion.

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5. We regret to say, however, that Mr. Hoyt does point up one shortcoming in our program; that is, the Vietnamese language capability of our officers and employees. Students for Vietnamese language courses have not been available due to the extraordinary demand by the Saigon Station for personnel to undertake the priority tasks assigned to it. We are taking specific steps to rectify this shortcoming. We will allocate a specific number of FE personnel slots for this language training, and we are now carefully reviewing officers being considered for assignment to Saigon with a view toward selecting those with demonstrated language capabilities for training in Vietnamese. We realize we must have qualified linguists assigned to Vietnam if our work is to be as successful as it should be.

/s/ William E. Colby.

William E. Colby  
Chief, Far East Division

Attachment:  
As stated

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